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Short article
Bend it like Beckham: Embodying the motor skills
of famous athletes
Patric Bach and Steven P. Tipper
Centre for Clinical and Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Wales, Bangor, UK
Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action.
Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of
action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses
were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the
viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence
on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours
that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are
directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodi-
ment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where
responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited.
Humans have a tendency to nonconsciously and
nonstrategically imitate the bodily states of
other people (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999;
Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van
Knippenberg, 2004) For instance, when watching
your favourite soccer team, you might find your
leg muscles tensing at the moment of a penalty
kick, or your arms being lifted in synchrony with
the player who has just scored a goal.
The processes of mimicry seem to rely on a direct
link between perception and action. Evidence is
accumulating that perceiving an action activates
the same representations as does the actual
performance of the same action (e.g., Hommel,
Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). This
overlap might allow humans to “embody” the beha-
viour of others and to infer the internal states
driving it (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, &
Ruppert, 2003; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005).
Direct evidence for the embodiment of action
comes from the discovery of so-called “mirror
neurons” in the macaque premotor cortex. These
neurons fire not only if the monkey performs a
particular action but also if it observes this action
being performed by another person (DiPellegrino,
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, Rizzolatti, 1992;
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). As
such, the mirror neurons provide a neuronal
substrate for the processes that link perception to
action. Imaging studies confirmed that a similar
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system is also present in humans (Buccino et al.,
2001; Gre`zes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham,
2003).
Behavioural studies also supported the idea of a
direct link between perception and action.
Observing an action primes the production of
similar actions and interferes with the production
of different actions (Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Kilner, Paulignan,
& Blakemore, 2003; Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2000). For instance, in a recent study
(Bach & Tipper, in press) we showed that obser-
ving a person kicking a football facilitated foot
responses relative to finger responses. Similarly,
observing a person typing facilitated finger
responses relative to foot responses.
Similar effects of motor activation have been
demonstrated for actions that are heard (e.g.,
Kohler et al., 2002), imagined (e.g., Gerardin
et al., 2000), or even read about (Glenberg &
Kaschak, 2002). In this paper we pose the question
of whether the roles of the human action system go
beyond the representation of actions that are
produced or perceived. We show that humans
also use their action system during person identifi-
cation, where the skilled motor behaviour associ-
ated with a person’s profession is automatically
encoded and represented in the observer’s action
system.
Consider watching the famous (for European
readers at least) soccer player Wayne Rooney.
Viewing such a well-known person automatically
activates several of his characteristics, such as his
profession (e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998;
McNeill & Burton, 2002). For Wayne Rooney,
this profession involves highly skilled motor beha-
viour. Thus, if humans use their own action system
to represent the motor skills of others, the mere
identification of this athlete might suffice to acti-
vate the representations related to kicking a
soccer ball, even if the corresponding actions are
not actually performed.
In the experiment four individuals were to be
identified. Two of them were soccer players associ-
ated with highly skilled actions with the feet, and
two were tennis players, associated with highly
skilled hand actions. We ensured that all
participants knew who these famous British ath-
letes were, but we never explicitly mentioned
their sport. Two individuals (one soccer and one
tennis player) were identified with a finger key-
press response, while the other two (one soccer
and one tennis player) were identified with a foot
response. The key question was whether the com-
patibility of response and sport of the athlete
(foot–soccer, hand–tennis) influenced the speed
and accuracy of the responses, even though the
photographs did not include any cues for the
actions usually performed by the athletes.
Any effects of the athletes’ profession on
response speed and accuracy would be evidence
for the embodiment of a person’s profession and
the associated skilled motor behaviour. However,
because this is the first study investigating this
issue, it is not clear in which direction the effect
will be. There are two alternatives. On the one
hand, it is possible that the participants assimilate
the motor behaviour of the viewed athletes, as was
the case in prior studies in which the actions were
actually presented (e.g., Bach & Tipper, in press).
Accordingly, responses should be faster and more
accurate when they are similar to the sport of the
athlete (foot responses for soccer, hand responses
for tennis).
On the other hand, it is also possible that a
contrast effect will be observed. Prior research in
social psychology (see Ferguson & Bargh, 2004,
for review) has demonstrated that assimilation
effects are typically only observed when a charac-
teristic is primed directly or through a stereotype.
If, however, the same characteristic is primed
implicitly because it is a trait of a viewed individ-
ual, contrast effects are observed. For instance,
priming the trait “intelligence” by means of the
“professor” stereotype enhanced the participants’
performance in subsequent intelligence tests
(Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). However, presenting
a specific individual of high intelligence (Albert
Einstein) impaired their performance.
Such contrast effects presumably emerge when
participants implicitly compare themselves with
the specific individuals (“exemplars”) and realize
that their own performance on this trait is clearly
inferior. If the skilled motor behaviour of an

























athlete is represented in a similar manner as are
these abstract traits of a person, then such auto-
matic comparison processes should also be
invoked in the present experiment. Thus, because
the participants are clearly far inferior tennis and
soccer players than are the presented athletes,
viewing an expert soccer or tennis player might
slow down foot and hand responses, respectively.
Method
Participants
A total of 40 students (11 males) ranging in age
from 18 to 42 years participated in the study. All
participants were students at the University of
Wales, Bangor. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. They received payment for their
participation (£5). The response assignment was
such that, for each participant, one tennis player
had to be identified with a finger key (compatible)
and the other tennis player with a foot key (incom-
patible). Analogously, one soccer player had to be
identified with a foot response (compatible) and
the other with a finger response (incompatible).
This assignment of athletes (Rooney, Rusedski,
Henman, and Owen) to response keys (foot/
finger) was counterbalanced across participants.
Material and apparatus
The experiment was controlled by Presentation
run on a 3.2-GHz PC running Windows XP.
A total of 96 pictures made up the stimulus set.
Equal numbers of these pictures were photographs
of Wayne Rooney, Michael Owen, Greg
Rusedski, and Tim Henman. Thus, there were
24 photographs of each of these athletes. One
half of these photographs showed the athletes
while carrying out non-sports-related activities—
for instance, talking at a press conference or
posing for a wedding photograph (outside
context, lower panels of Figure 1). The other
half of the pictures showed the athletes while on
the soccer field or the tennis court, dressed in the
corresponding clothes (within context, upper
panels of Figure 1). Care was taken that in these
latter images the athletes were not performing
Figure 1. Example key assignment. This participant has to identify the tennis player Greg Rusedski and the soccer player Michael Owen with
a hand response and the tennis player Tim Henman and the soccer player Wayne Rooney with a foot response. The upper row shows example
images of the athletes in their typical environment (in context) and the lower row shows example images of the athletes in everyday situations
(out of context).

























the skilled motor behaviour of their sport. Thus,
there was no image that showed a soccer player
kicking a soccer ball, nor an image that showed a
tennis player striking a ball with a racket.
Procedure and design
The participants were seated in a dimly lit room
facing a colour monitor at a distance of 60 cm.
After the computer-driven instruction and a
short training phase of 16 trials the experiment
proper started. It lasted for about 15 minutes and
consisted of four blocks of 96 trials each. In each
block, all images appeared once in a randomized
order. Thus, in one half of the trials athletes had
to be identified with a compatible response
(hand response for tennis players; foot response
for soccer players), and in the other half they had
to be identified with an incompatible response.
The course of each trial was as follows: After
the participants initiated the trial by pressing the
space bar with their left hand, the photograph of
the athlete was presented after 500 ms. They
identified the athlete by either pressing the foot
pedal with their right foot or the enter button on
the computer keyboard with their right index
finger. Participants were instructed to give their
judgement in the interval in which this photo-
graph was on the screen (1,500 ms). If their judge-
ment was correct, the next trial started. If they
committed an error or did not react in the given
response interval of 1,500 ms an error message
was displayed.
Results
For the analysis of response times (RTs; Figure 2,
top panel), trials in which the participants pressed
the wrong button (5.3%) or did not react in the
given reaction time interval (2.2%) were excluded.
The remaining RTs were entered into a repeated
measurements analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with the within-subjects factors compatibility
(compatible/incompatible) and context (inside/
outside). There was a main effect of context, F(1,
39) ¼ 11.7, p , .001. The athletes were identified
more quickly when they were seen at everyday
activities than when seen in their sporty contexts.
The task was to identify the faces, and, because
the face images tended to be a little larger and
had gaze directed towards the viewer in the
outside-context images (e.g., Macrae, Hood,
Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002), this facilitated
performance. The critical main effect of compat-
ibility, F(1, 39) ¼ 5.0, p , .05, was significant.
Surprisingly, this effect took the form of a contrast
effect. The athletes were identified more quickly
when the effector required to identify them was
incompatible with the action that they were
usually carrying out. Context and compatibility
did not interact, F(1, 39) , 1.
Figure 2. RTs (upper panel) and error rates (lower panel). In each
graph, the two bars on the left show the data for the identification of
athletes in the inside-context images, and the two bars on the right
show the data for the out-of-context images. The black bars show the
data when sport and response were compatible (foot–soccer; hand–
tennis), and the white bars show the data when sport and response
were incompatible (foot–tennis, hand–soccer). The error bars show
the standard error of the mean.

























The ANOVA carried out on the error rates
showed the same pattern (Figure 2, lower panel).
The main effect of context, F(1, 39) ¼ 4.0, p ,
.06, was marginally significant. The athletes were
identified more reliably when they were seen at
everyday activities than when seen in their sporty
contexts. The predicted important main effect of
compatibility, F(1, 39) ¼ 8.6, p , .005, was
again highly significant. The athletes were ident-
ified more reliably when the effector required to
identify them was incompatible with the skilled
action with which they were associated. Context
and compatibility did not interact, F(1, 39) ¼ 1.2.
Discussion
The present study demonstrated for the first time
that viewing persons of high motor skill—in the
present case famous soccer and tennis players—
affects the action system of the observer. When
identifying famous athletes in various situations,
the participants’ motor responses were influenced
by their similarity to the skilled motor behaviour
of the athletes.
These effects were similar when the athletes
were presented in their typical environments and
when they were presented out of context at non-
sports-related activities. If anything, the action-
compatibility effects were a little larger in the
out-of-context condition (see Figure 2). As such,
the data reflected the automatic activation of a
viewed person’s profession (cf. Bodenhausen &
Macrae, 1998) and the skilled motor behaviour
associated with it, irrespective of contextual cues
that could have primed this behaviour. Thus, the
present study suggests that people use their own
action system to represent knowledge about
other persons.
Intriguingly, the activation of the action system
took the form of a contrast effect. Responding with
the effector that was also involved in the skilled
motor behaviour of the athletes was slower and
less accurate than responding with a different effec-
tor. Hand responses were faster and more accurate
when identifying soccer players. Conversely, foot
responses were faster and more accurate when
identifying tennis players. In other words,
perceiving a highly skilled athlete inhibited
similar motor behaviour in the observer.
This result is opposite to the pattern observed in
prior research. Typically, facilitatory effects of the
priming of motor behaviours on the production of
similar responses have been reported, irrespective
of whether behaviours were seen (e.g., Bach &
Tipper, in press), heard (e.g., Kohler et al., 2002),
or even read about (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak,
2002). The main difference between these studies
and the present experiment was, of course, that in
our current experiment the critical motor
behaviours were not directly activated but were
implicit properties of the viewed famous athletes.
Therefore, our new findings suggest that the
representation of the skilled motor behaviour
possessed by other people shows a similar pattern
as the representation of more abstract personal
characteristics, such as intelligence or old age (for
a review, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). It has
been demonstrated that when such characteristics
are primed directly or by means of a stereotype,
they give rise to assimilation effects; that is, the
participants act as if they would exhibit the charac-
teristics themselves (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).
However, if the same traits are activated because
they are characteristics of a specific well-known
person (“exemplars”), the assimilation effects turn
into contrast effects. For instance, priming partici-
pants with the “professor” stereotype enhanced
their performance in subsequent intelligence tests
but priming them with the highly intelligent
specific exemplar “Albert Einstein” impaired their
performance (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). The
present findings suggest that a similar reversal also
occurs for the representation of skilled motor beha-
viour that is not actually perceived, but which is an
implicit characteristic of a well-known individual.
Presumably, such contrast effects occur because
observers automatically compare themselves with
the presented individuals (Dijksterhuis & Bargh,
2001). Similarly, in the present study, perceiving
a person of high motor skill impaired the perform-
ance of similar actions of the lesser skilled partici-
pants. It is noteworthy that the paradigms used in
the prior studies only allowed the measurement of
these effects after considerable time had passed

























since the first presentation of the exemplar person.
The present study showed that the effects can be
detected very early after the presentation of the
athletes, and that they persist even after repeated
presentation. As such, the present findings
suggest that the comparison processes are very
quick and automatic, or that the outcomes of
prior comparisons have become associated with
the individuals and become reactivated when
they are seen (Barsalou et al., 2003).
In future studies, we will investigate the influ-
ence of social comparisons on the action system
of the observer more directly. Dijksterhuis and
colleagues (1998) showed that being primed with
Albert Einstein not only reduced the intellectual
performance of the participants but also induced
them to see themselves as comparatively stupid.
If the contrast effects in the present experiment
are due to social comparisons, one would expect
that the size of the contrast effect correlates with
the perceived skill difference between the partici-
pant and the athletes encountered in the exper-
iment. Participants that perceive their own skill
level to be similar to that of the athletes should
show less contrast effect (or even facilitatory
effects) than should participants that perceive
themselves as comparatively unskilled.
In summary, our study shows that the acti-
vation of a person’s profession—and the skilled
motor behaviour associated with it—directly
affects the action system of the observer at the
time of the perception of the individuals. These
embodiment effects were observed even though
the motor characteristics were task irrelevant,
and there were no observable cues for action in
the stimuli. The present results support embodied
views of social knowledge (e.g., Barsalou et al.,
2003). Accordingly, the roles of the human
action system extend beyond action production
and perception, being also involved in social
perception: specifically representing the motor
skills of people, even when they are not observed
acting.
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